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1) SCCS is the largest carbon capture and storage research group in the UK. Our 
internationally renowned researchers provide connected strength across the full CCS chain. 
With our unique position SCCS is able to act as the conduit between academia, industry and 
government.  SCCS is funded by government grants, research councils, with several 
projects funded in partnership with commercial CCS developers. SCCS is independent, and 
does not speak for, or represent, any industry or political grouping. 
 
2) The position of SCCS, is that carbon capture and storage provides one essential part of a 
pathway towards a sustainable future for industrialised nations. CCS provides direct, and 
large, reduction of carbon emissions at point sources such as power plant, refineries or 
carbon intensive industries. Several studies in the UK (ETI, UK government DECC) have 
shown that CCS is a no-regrets option, providing substantial cost saving to decarbonisation 
trajectories which is resilient to a wide range of future scenarios for electricity and heat 
supply. 
 
3) In principle, CCS is capable of being enacted simply, within the existing industrial and 
power supply systems. CCS can provide substantial decarbonisation, with minimum 
disruption. 
 
4) Well-known problems for CCS, which are currently acting as barriers to experimentation 
or to deployment, include amongst many  
A) The high cost of experimental or first projects at industrial scale.  
B) The energy penalty involved from parasitic loading of capture and regeneration 
equipment.  
C) The uncertainty of reliable geological storage for CO2.  
D) Lack of a persistent business model which increases costs of existing polluting 
operations, such that CCS becomes commercially viable in its own right.  
E) Long-term ownership of stored carbon dioxide. 
 
5) These problems can be simplified into two factors, which require to be solved in a way 
which is credible by industry and public, for timescales beyond the lifetime of individual 
projects.  
 
Firstly, there is no direct incentive for any commercial organisation to undertake CCS. 
European or Member State policy on climate, translated into the energy supply system, fails 
to make a direct connection which can drive business investment. A much more direct 
connection is required, such as targeted taxation, or price increase, on the emissions from 
hydrocarbon combustion at point sources. That will embed the cost of carbon into the price 
for the product transmitted to public or other end users of power or heat, and thereby make 
attractive the alternative route where carbon is stored, not emitted.   
 
Secondly, there is no coherent industry grouping promoting CCS, or genuinely seeking to 
co-develop projects, share knowledge, or reduce costs. This contrasts with the manifest 
success of renewable energy (RES) installation across the EU. RES has the benefit of well 
organised and coordinated engagement between developers and politicians and 
policymakers. RES also has the benefit of guaranteed premium prices for low carbon 
electricity, on a project-by-project appraisal, during 15 to 20 year project time spans. 
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6) It is clear that requesting Member States to voluntarily develop and deploy CCS has not 
happened successfully. By contrast, mandatory Europe wide targets for renewables 
installation for 2020 are proving extremely successful. However, over specification of 
granularity can be counter-productive. Current developments show that forcing installation of 
multiple units of offshore wind power before cost reduction benefits have been realised 
through a number of learning cycles, appears to be poorer value per megawatt hour than a 
more relaxed progress. Consequently, any mandate may be better positioned in terms of 
overall carbon emissions reduction for a Member State, which can be satisfied by a chosen 
mix of CCS, fuel switching, renewables, nuclear, or efficiency gains. It will be necessary to 
counteract the possibility of carbon reductions by offshore export of manufacturing or other 
industries, which merely leak the CO2 to elsewhere outside the EU. Likewise, the principle of 
burden sharing across the European Community means that Member States with large 
portfolios of fossil fuel generation should not be selectively disadvantaged. Using CCS 
certificates, tradable between states may be a way of sharing this burden 
 
Question one: Should Member States that currently have a high share of coal and gas in 
their energy mix as well as in industrial processes, and that have not yet done so, be 
required to: 
 
a) develop a clear roadmap on how to restructure their electricity generation sector towards 
non-carbon emitting fuels (nuclear or renewables) by 2050, 
 
We strongly support such a requirement. These roadmaps should include defined 
milestones and carbon budgets at intermediate stages in order to assess Member State 
progress. It is expected that substantial quantities of CCS will feature for many Member 
States, unless using different technologies (and lower costs) can credibly deliver the same 
emissions reductions. This is of particular concern for energy-intensive industries, where 
CCS currently remains the sole credible de-carbonisation technology. 
b) develop a national strategy to prepare for the deployment of CCS technology. 
To be credible, national strategies for CCS deployment must address the points raised in 4) 
and 5) above. Critically, Member States reliant on CCS for decarbonisation must either: 
A) Enable, and support CO2 storage (should appropriate geology be available) within their 
territories. For Member States without a considerable oil and gas sector and associated data 
to build upon it should be recognised that proving up possible geological storage to a 
confidence sufficient to allow for large volumes of CO2 injection is estimated to take at a 
minimum 5-10 years. To reduce investor risk, such work should be undertaken in advance of 
the specific planning of CO2 capture facilities.   
B) Or, in the event that a Member State would be reliant on the development and access to 
CO2 storage located in another Member State, it should ensure that such access is agreed 
to an appropriate timetable, and in doing so potentially formally support the early stage CCS 
development in the prospective CO2 storage host – CCS certificates tradable between 
states, may be a way of sharing the burden of development.  
Reliance on trans-boundary storage is technically logical, as certain Member States possess 
storage potential in considerable excess to their own needs, along with more acceptable 
siting and industry and government experienced in sub-surface operations. However, 
enabling trans-boundary movement of CO2 requires both international and bi-lateral 
permissions to be granted. As with A) above, such negotiations are necessary prior to any 
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detailed deployment planning, and given the relative lack of experience of government and 
regulators with CO2 may take many years to complete1.  
7) The system of EU allowances to identify emissions has been successful. Converting that 
into a European trading scheme has clearly been a failure. A critical aspect of this failure is 
the extraordinarily low carbon price, which currently has no impact on business decisions. 
Another critical aspect of failure has been the strategy of releasing large numbers of EU 
allowances into the market several years ahead of need. This, combined with grandfathering 
of EU allowances, has enabled industries which use fossil power to beat the system and 
purchase allowances at unintended low prices. 
 
Question two: How should the ETS be re-structured, so that it could also provide 
meaningful incentives for CCS deployment? Should this be complemented by using 
instruments based on auctioning revenues, similar to NER300? 
 
Realistically, even if the currently proposed reforms should be successful in enacting the 
ETS, carbon price alone cannot be relied upon to provide meaningful incentive for early CCS 
deployment, and may even struggle to sufficiently incentivise much cheaper fuel switching. 
The ETS restructuring should keep its scope of included emitter sites as wide as now, or 
potentially even wider. The most critical policy failures are: A) the lack of price control over 
EU-Allowances, and: B) the lack of an index-linked reliable base-price which can become 
bankable over a 10-20 year period enabling loans or guarantees to fund large power plant 
and CCS projects. 
The use of auctioning revenues has been explored as a financing mechanism, but clearly 
needs both much greater confidence in the sums expected to be raised, and considerable 
structural alteration from that of the NER300. Any future auction measures could include re-
designing the eligibility criteria, to allow a broader (and potentially more pro-active) range of 
sectors and actors to engage in the early development of CCS. These should include gas 
power, and relatively small scale (≤10^5 tonnes CO2 per year) high concentration industrial 
sources of CO2 which could play a cost effective role in establishing transport and storage 
infrastructure, independent of the complexity and cost of low-concentration CO2 capture 
from power plant.          
8) Early deployment of projects is initially a blockage of finance lending. To remove this 
blockage requires attention to all the problems in 4) above. 
Question three: Should the Commission propose other means of support or consider other 
policy measures to pave the road towards early deployment, by: 
 
a. support through auctioning recycling or other funding approaches 
b. an Emission Performance Standard 
c. a CCS certificate system 
d. another type of policy measure 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Exploratory discussions undertaken between government representatives in the North Sea Basin 
Task Force suggest that while existing bi-lateral agreements for e.g. natural gas transit might provide 
an initial basis for transboundary storage of CO2 negotiations, the nature of the required very-long 
term stewardship of imported CO2 by the storage host has few precedents. As a result, multiple years 
of negotiation might be necessary to establish trans-boundary storage agreement between producer 
and host. The EC can play a role in shortening this lead-in time. 
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A suite of measures such as those listed above is available to incentivise CCS. We argue 
that all (individually or in combination) are capable of delivery should their design be 
sufficiently robust. Whichever package is chosen it must:  
i) be reliable and resilient to change during a 20 year outlook,  
ii) provide “sticks” of penalties making present-day behaviour progressively more difficult,  
iii) provide “carrots” of benefits, making future types of behaviour inevitably acceptable, and 
giving incentive and advantage to ‘first-movers’ and ‘early-movers’.  
See also 11) below. 
9) It is very clear from analysis by the International Energy Agency that the existing global 
fleet of power plant and industrial sources can emit through its lifetime more than enough 
CO2 to produce rapid and dangerous climate change. It is also clear from climate modelling 
that it is not the rate of CO2 emission that is important, but the total amount of CO2 emitted. 
Consequently it is necessary, from a scientific analysis, to require that CCS be fitted to all 
new power plant and industrial sources, and that CCS has to be retrofitted and operated on 
much of the existing power plant and industrial facilities.  
Experience in the UK shows CCS-ready to be a meaningless definition unless the details of 
design and planning are strictly inspected and enforced. In particular, the identification of, 
commercial appraisal of, and transportation route to high quality CO2 storage in the 
tonnages required, in the timescales required, has proven to be a major loophole which 
needs to be closed. We refer to response to Q1 above.  
Question four: Should energy utilities henceforth be required to install CCS-ready 
equipment for all new investments (coal and potentially also gas) in order to facilitate the 
necessary CCS retrofit? 
CCS has to be fitted to all new coal and gas fuelled power plant, and also needs to be 
retrofitted to any existing power plant or large industrial facility operating beyond 2030. The 
expected volumes of CO2 requiring transportation and storage should this be realised are 
such that immediate investment in confirming storage potential and establishing major 
transportation corridors is essential. 
10) It is likely that CCS pathways will diverge between North America and Europe. In North 
America the cost of capture may be driven down by requirements to provide low-cost CO2 in 
very large tonnages to projects undertaking CO2-EOR. It may not be necessary for Europe 
to devote specific and abundant attention to cost reduction in capture. By contrast the 
development and validation of geological storage within Europe can only be undertaken 
within Europe, and is a valuable asset, which cannot be exported or imported. We suggest 
that the availability of commercially tested storage will very rapidly become a limiting step 
immediately following the operation of very first grant funded CCS projects in Europe. 
Consequently, a much greater attention needs to be devoted to creating a system which can 
enable routine exploration and appraisal, and development and exploitation of CO2 storage 
within Europe capable of securely accommodating billions of tonnes of CO2. This storage 
has to be commercially acceptable before it can be included as part of the bankable 
business proposition for commercial CCS projects. In terms of scale, 3 billion tons of CO2 
storage is required for the UK alone by 2025, and across Europe it is possible that 10-20 
Billion tonnes of CO2 storage will need to be commercially identified by 2025. This contrasts 
to the current situation where only a few tens of millions of tonnes of storage is validated.  
Question 5: Should fossil fuel providers contribute to CCS demonstration and deployment 
through specific measures that ensure additional financing? 
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11) Additional financing is required, on a routine basis, to ensure that CCS can become 
business as usual in multiple Member States. The most direct method would be direct 
taxation on fossil fuel production at source, or when fossil fuel is imported into the EU. We 
note that the substantial grants given (voluntarily) by the Norwegian government to support 
CCS projects in Poland (€130 million) and Romania (€30 million) provide a precedent which 
in essence direct revenues generated from the sale of fossil fuels towards CCS. 
However, regulating such measures may raise substantial objections from established 
practice, and may also become difficult when considering the import of goods from outside 
the EU with high embedded carbon liabilities. A second method could be to selectively 
impose a base carbon price, in order to stimulate initial CCS developments. This carbon 
price would inevitably be passed through to consumers, but the effects of such a price would 
be minimised by electricity providers who undertook effective CCS to avoid paying the 
carbon price on emissions. A third method is to authorise a higher price for low carbon 
electricity derived from CCS power plant. If that is combined with a mandate to develop 
CCS, then the additional revenue can be directed by power companies towards construction 
of CCS projects. A final method can be to impose a carbon production levy on shale gas or 
coal bed methane production within member states. As these unconventional hydrocarbon 
resources are anticipated to be very low price, then a small amount of levy taxation may not 
be noticeable on top of an already reduced price for fuel. Levy taxation receipts would be 
hypothecated to support CCS and low carbon developments. 
12) In several Member States there are substantial resources of partially depleted 
hydrocarbon fields, particularly oil. It is possible to use CO2 injection as a means to increase 
the efficiency of oil production (CO2-EOR), while also storing CO2. Research undertaken by 
SCCS shows that it is possible to achieve overall carbon storage while allowing the 
additional oil to be produced. Regulatory frameworks designed to encourage carbon storage 
combined with CO2-EOR have the potential to generate serious interest and investment 
from oil companies and access their expertise in managing subsurface fluids. Additional oil 
production could also generate additional production tax revenues giving a net financial 
returning available for government investment in CCS. 
Question 6: What are the main obstacles to ensuring sufficient demonstration of CCS in the 
EU? 
For obstacles to bringing forward CCS projects we refer to 4) above. Even the first wave of 
projects will need to operate on a commercial basis for 15 to 20 years. The distinction 
between ‘demonstration’ and ‘deployment’ is therefore not clear cut, and is currently a useful 
excuse for sectors seeking to avoid active consideration of future deployment of CCS. 
Achieving ‘sufficient demonstration’ should therefore be measured as to how the first wave 
of projects assists the ability for Europe to enact rapid and widespread CCS deployment 
before 2030 as envisaged in current de-carbonisation scenarios e.g. Energy Roadmap 2050. 
We re-iterate from 10) that Europe has a serious deficit in proven capable geological storage 
to receive the quantities of CO2 resulting from envisaged levels of CCS deployment.   
13) By far the largest European resource of CO2 storage lies offshore in the North Sea, and 
potentially in the Southern Baltic. These resources have been, and are, evaluated by 
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prospective desk studies, but remain to be commercially validated. There is no incentive for 
large commercial companies, or pipeline operators to validate storage beyond the immediate 
need for isolated demonstration project proposals. Consequently, the development of the 
capability to store hundreds of millions of tonnes of CO2 has no inherent champion, and is 
likely to lag behind (and hence restrict) commercial power plant propositions. This is a 
market failure. 
14) Utilising existing sources of high-purity CO2, at sites around coastal Europe, is under 
evaluation by SCCS. It seems very feasible to construct a programme utilising shipping 
tankers to collect CO2 from multiple sources. Collected CO2 can be transported by tanker to 
offshore platforms for injection, or use converted port facilities to connect to existing CO2 
compliant pipelines, which can take this CO2 offshore for injection. Calculations indicate 
that, for a budget of € 200-300 million, it will be possible to undertake the first injection of 
CO2 in late 2014, and to undertake a rolling programme during the subsequent 5 -10 years, 
where CO2 is injected into 10 different substantial saline storage formations offshore. 
Injection of 1-3 million tonnes CO2 in each of these geological storage formations will 
confirm their suitability and provide commercial proving sufficient to enable these storage 
regions to become developed during the 2020s. Such a common interest project can use 
some of the existing un-spent or returned CCS support monies held within Europe. 
Question seven: How can public acceptance for CCS be increased? 
Public acceptance has created a barrier to CO2 storage below land in a few member states, 
but its responsibility for the failure of CCS has been overstated. However, it is clear that 
offshore storage is at present the more generally accepted option. We refer to our response 
to Q1, that while the energy mix remains a reserved topic, Member States will have to 
decide between the possible additional cost of not undertaking CCS (or negotiating storage 
of captured CO2 to outwith their territory) versus the possible unpopularity of local CO2 
storage. 
Public discomfort about subsurface usage is much wider than CO2 storage (including gas 
storage, shale gas, nuclear waste), and a much broader public engagement on the usage of 
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